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Executive Summary1
At least 250,000 civilian have been killed in the Syrian conflict since 2011.2 The war has 
devastated infrastructure and economy3 and has transformed entire regions of  the state 
into semi-anarchical or warlord-ruled areas. Millions of  Syrians have fled their homes 
to seek refuge either in different areas of  the country or abroad. The scale of  this forced 
migration has no precedent in the modern history of  the Middle East; according to offi-
cial sources there are 6.6 million internally displaced persons and 4.7 million refugees.4 
About half  of  the Syrian population is forcibly displaced.
Owing to its geographic proximity, the overlap in language and historical relations with its 
neighbour, Lebanon is one of  the most obvious destinations for Syrians trying to escape 
the civil war, and around 1.2 million have registered there with the UNHCR. Yet, this 
small country (only slightly bigger than Cyprus) with a population of  about 4 million and 
a history of  troubled relations with Damascus, is hardly an ideal refuge.5 Many of  Leba-
non’s political factions and paramilitary groups are closely related to or directly involved 
in events in Syria, and Lebanese state institutions are known for their scarce capacity for 
the provision of  essential services and security even to Lebanese nationals. 
Nevertheless, although five years ago it was plausible that the conflict would spill into Leb-
anon, grave security incidents that have occured have remained localised and episodic. 
While the refugee crisis has caused concerns and been perceived as yet another desta-
bilising factor in the social, political, and economic context of  the country, considering 
the magnitude of  the phenomenon its impact has not yet caused as much disruption as 
could have been expected. Syrians in Lebanon are vulnerable and those in the category of 
‘displaced’ (nazih) are increasingly segregated. The local host communities are strained by 
limited infrastructural capacity and increased competition for services and resources. Still, 
episodes of  friction with the refugee population have been relatively limited.
This report provides an account of  the situation in five sections. Firstly, it offers an account 
of  the unfolding of  the crisis from the perspective of  Lebanese political institutions. Sec-
ondly, it maps political reactions to the crisis, focussing on the main actors involved. 
1 I am grateful for the constructive comments of  the reviewers of  this report, whose comments I tried 
to incorporate as much as possible. I am especially grateful to those interviewed as part of  my research. 
This research was partly funded by the Leverhulme Trust, grant ECF-2014-675. The responsibility for 
the content of  this report remains exclusively that of  the author. 
2 ‘Ahead of  Geneva Talks, Un Envoy Addresses All Syrians in Video Message’, UN News Centre. 
Available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53118#.VrnygPmLSHt (accessed 8 
February 2016).
3 David Butter, Syria’s Economy: Picking up the Pieces (London: The Royal Institute of  International 
Affairs, 2015).
4 UN OCHA, ‘Syrian Arab Republic’, United Nations. Available at http://www.unocha.org/syria 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
5 International Crisis Group, ‘Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon’, Middle East Report (Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, 2013).
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Thirdly, it analyses the status of  Syrians displaced in Lebanon – displacement being one 
of  the main sources of  vulnerability. Fourthly, it highlights the role played by local admin-
istrations and international organisations in managing the crisis. And finally, it illustrates 
how Syrian-Lebanese migrations have a consolidated history based on mutual economic 
interests, and social and cultural ties.
Based on these considerations, the report then proposes a set of  possible courses of  action 
to be undertaken by various stakeholders. The objective of  this report is to strengthen 
knowledge and understanding of  the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon and, on this basis, 
it proposes policy guidelines that can facilitate greater protection for refugees as well as 
support the stability and development of  the host country. 
Suggested Guidelines for Action
To Lebanese Institutions
• Lebanese public institutions should develop a clear legal framework which provides 
refugees with a well-defined status that protects their rights.
• Lebanese institutions should allow Syrians in Lebanon to access essential services and 
enjoy fundamental rights, including the right to work.
• Lebanese political groups should address the Syrian presence as a purely humani-
tarian issue, trying to avoid the politicisation of  refugee identity by associating their 
presence with various political or sectarian factions.
• The rich academic and civil society community of  Lebanon should be supported in 
developing research and communications strategies to avoid the spread of  xenopho-
bic rhetoric and to show the real implications of  the crisis from a problem-solving 
perspective. 
• Lebanese institutions should consider the development and establishment of  a regional 
cooperation process for refugee protection.
To States and Supranational Institutions
• States, as well as supranational institutions such as the European Union (EU) and the 
Gulf  Cooperation Council (GCC) should increase and sustain financial support for 
transparent and effective humanitarian action and developmental projects for both 
refugees and host communities. 
• States and supranational institutions should fulfil their aid and funding pledges as 
announced in international conferences.
• All states and supranational institutions should immediately engage in resettlement 
operations, and/or in the revision of  visa and migration regulations so that they are 
proportionate to the magnitude of  the crisis.
8 The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience
• States should abide by the legal obligations to which they are bound on the basis of  in-
ternational customary law and the treaties they are party to (including the 1951 Con-
vention on the Status of  Refugees, its additional protocols and other regional treaties).
• States should consider that ‘burden-sharing’ instead of  ‘buck-passing’ is the key strat-
egy to cope with the crisis successfully and in a long-term perspective.
To International Organisations 
• Ensure that relations between host communities and refugees remain constructive, 
thus making sure aid does not cause a sense of  relative deprivation and have polar-
ising effects. 
• Emphasise and enable the development of  crisis management for local communities 
and the national government. 
• Consider that foreign aid, although vital in sustaining current operations, can only 
be a short- to medium-term strategy, and long-term economic sustainability of  the 
Syrian presence should be facilitated. 
• Capitalise on the historical record of  Syrian migrations to Lebanon, which has been 
an important economic resource for decades and also relies on cultural as well as 
family connections. Informal networks are also important instruments through which 
refugees can enhance their living conditions when displaced.
To Civil Society Organisations
• Maintain a separation from political and sectarian dynamics. 
• Ensure that relations between host communities and refugees remain positive, making 
sure that aid does not cause a sense of  relative deprivation and have polarising effects.
To the General Public
• Donate to well-reputed and transparent aid organisations that clearly and publicly 
account for their activity.
• Stay informed, using reliable and documented sources. Do not become swayed by 
superficial stereotyping and unjustified perceptions of  insecurity associated with mi-
gration processes.
• Be aware that states and their governments (whatever their political orientation) have 
a universal legal obligation to help and protect refugees, grounded in international 
customary law and further reinforced by several international treaties regularly rati-
fied by a majority of  states.
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The Unfolding of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon
It was on 28 April 2011 that the refugee crisis caused by conflict between the Syrian oppo-
sition and government forces first directly affected Lebanon. About two thousand Syrians 
from the area of  Talkalakh crossed the border into Lebanon and temporarily settled in 
the northern area of  Wadi Khaled, where some of  them had family connections or trade 
relations.1 
It was the beginning of  a phenomenon that would grow to an unprecedented magnitude 
in the following four years. By January 2015, nearly 1.2 million Syrians were registered 
with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, amounting to a 
quarter of  its autochthonous population. In May 2015 the Lebanese government asked 
the UNHCR to suspend the official registration of  refugees, and since then no other reli-
able figures have been made public. In all likelihood the refugee population has continued 
to grow, albeit at a slower pace.
Since the beginning of  the crisis in 2011, the Lebanese Government (then headed by 
pro-Saudi Prime Minister Saad Hariri) and the UNHCR, have been active in addressing 
the situation. The UNHCR established a presence in the northern border area and the 
government tasked the High Relief  Committee2 as well as the Ministry of  Social Affairs3 
(MoSA) to ensure that that refugees coming from Syria received the necessary humanitar-
ian attention. The phenomenon, at the time, was perceived as short-term and contained. 
Many were expecting the imminent fall of  Bashar al-Assad’s regime,4 and the presence of 
refugees in Lebanon was an opportunity for the regime’s critics to highlight the ferocious-
ness of  its repression and the repercussions of  this for Lebanon.
In June 2011, Najib Mikati, more closely connected with the Syrian establishment, 
replaced Hariri as Prime Minister. Mikati’s government did not significantly change the 
general approach to the crisis, in the sense that most of  the activity related to crisis man-
agement remained under the control of  the MoSA, the High Relief  Committee (whose 
responsibility was mainly financial) and the UNHCR which was the main coordinator. 
For a year or so, the refugee presence in Lebanon kept growing but remained relatively 
limited. By July 2012, there were about one hundred thousand Syrians registered with 
UNHCR.5
1 ‘UNHCR Works with Lebanon to Help Thousands Fleeing Syria Violence’, UNHCR. Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4dd66d3e6.html (accessed 8 February 2016).
2 ‘High Relief  Commission (HRC Lebanon)’, UNHCR. Available at https://data.unhcr.org/syrianref-
ugees/partner.php?OrgId=13 (accessed 8 February 2016).
3 ‘Website of  the Ministry of  Social Affairs of  Lebanon’, Ministry of  Social Affairs. Available at http://
www.socialaffairs.gov.lb/MSADefault.aspx (accessed 8 February 2016).
4 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘Hillary Clinton: Bashar’s Days Are ‘Numbered’’, The Atlantic. Available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/hillary-clinton-bashars-days-are-num-
bered/259547/ (accessed 8 February 2016); ‘Lebanon’s Hariri Says Syria’s Assad Fall ‘Inevitable’’, 
Reuters. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-hariri-idUSBRE91D1ER20130214 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
5 ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal (Lebanon)’, UNHCR. 
Available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122# (accessed 8 February 2016).
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As events evolved, Mikati’s government became less keen to engage directly in crisis man-
agement. The Syrian conflict was beginning to look more long-term with inevitable, 
although uncertain, repercussions for Lebanon. The Syrian presence consequently became 
a source of  political contention within the divided political arena of  the host country. 
In March 2012, the UN enacted the first Regional Response Plan (RRP), a humanitarian 
project which, with its subsequent addenda, was unprecedentedly large. The RRP was 
launched with an overall budget demand of  100 million US Dollars, which subsequently 
became 1 billion US Dollars in 2013 and 1.7 billion in 2014.6 A new programme was 
launched in 2015 with a forecasted budget of  2.14 billion US Dollars, while the continua-
tion of  this programme in 2016 requires funding of  up to 2.48 billion US Dollars in order 
to be fully implemented.
In June 2012, all political parties adopted the Baʿadba Declaration,7 which formally 
stated Lebanon’s dissociation policy from regional and international conflict as part of  its 
National Dialogue framework. Interestingly, the declaration did not refer to the refugee 
situation, but mentioned the importance of  the ‘right to humanitarian solidarity’ as ‘guar-
anteed under the constitution and the law.’ 8
Owing to internal quarrels,9 Mikati removed the High Relief  Council from the crisis man-
agement task, and the MoSA became the main entity in charge of  collaborating with 
the UNHCR on the matter. Almost all officers interviewed observed that the ministry’s 
capacities were limited in terms of  infrastructure and know-how. The UNHCR and its 
partner agencies were given a great deal of  autonomy over a situation in which the Leb-
anese government was fundamentally unwilling to act, fearing that taking a stance would 
have destabilising effects. 
In late spring and summer of  2012, new reports emerged in the Lebanese media indi-
cating that the General Security Office (GSO), the security agency also responsible for 
border enforcement,10 had begun a process of  repatriation of  Syrians, including refugees.11 
6  UNHCR Annual Reports, in 2012 90% of  the funding was provided, 72% in 2013 and 46% in 2014. 
At the end of  2014, a new expanded plan was launched – the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 
(3RP) – with a more comprehensive approach also targeting aspects of  the crisis affecting host coun-
tries. The part of  this plan dedicated to the case of  Lebanon, has a requested budget of  2.14 billion US 
Dollars which is equivalent to about 5% of  Lebanon’s GDP in 2013.
7 Permanent Mission of  Lebanon to the UN, Baabda Declaration Issued by the National Dialogue Committee on 
11 June 2012 (New York: UN Security Council, 2012).
8 ‘National Dialogue’, Presidency of  the Republic of  Lebanon. Available at http://www.presidency.gov.lb/
English/News/Pages/NationalDialogue.aspx (accessed 8 February 2016).
9  Mohamed Nazzal, ‘Lebanon’s Former Aid Chief: Millions Spent to Fund Tripoli Fighting’, Al-Akhbar. 
Available at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18991 (accessed 8 February 2016).
10 ‘Directorate of  the General Security’, General Security Office (GSO). Available at http://www.gener-
al-security.gov.lb/Default.aspx?lang=ar-lb (accessed 8 February 2016).
11 Ghida Frangieh, ‘Forced Departure: How Lebanon Evades the International Principle of  Non-Re-
foulement’, The Legal Agenda. Available at http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=675&lang=en 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
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This was in obvious breach of  the non-refoulement principle,12 and subsequently Mikati’s 
government adopted a non-refoulement policy that was observed by the GSO, although 
reports of  cases of  forced repatriation have occasionally emerged.13 
In October 2012, the Mikati government began to fall apart. After the assassination of 
Wissam al-Hassan, a major figure in the Lebanese security apparatus, Mikati’s resigna-
tion was called for by the opposition.14 Nevertheless, he remained in power until March 
2013, when Tammam Salam, a political figure close to the Saudi sphere of  influence, 
was designated as new Prime Minister. However, as often is the case in Lebanon, it took 
months before Salam could put a government together. His office only became operative 
in February 2014, with a cabinet composed by 24 members.15 
While the Lebanese executive was stuck in a long transitional phase, the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon began to grow faster.16 The ‘Open Door’ policy allowed for the free flow of  Syrians 
across the border without control or restraint, and without identifying the specific nature 
of  displacement – knowledge which could have enabled better provision for their needs. 
Since the beginning of  the crisis, the UNHCR had been registering on average 47,000 
refugees per month. In July 2013, the number of  Syrians registered with the UNHCR 
reached half  a million.17 Until then, Syrians were able to cross the border with Lebanon 
simply by presenting a form of  ID. This was possible through an agreement18 related to 
the Treaty of  Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination19 between Syria and Leba-
non. In July 2013, the GSO began to implement stricter document checks at the border,20 
although this measure did not have great effect. Of  the three main refugee host countries 
(Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan), Lebanon has had the fastest growing Syrian population. 
12 Non-refoulement is a principle of  international law that reflects the commitment of  the international 
community to ensure that refugees are not returned to persecution or danger.
13 ‘Lebanon: Stop Forcible Returns to Syria’, Human Rights Watch. Available at https://www.hrw.org/
news/2016/01/11/lebanon-stop-forcible-returns-syria (accessed 8 February 2016).
14 ‘March 14 Calls on PM Mikati to Resign after Hasan Killing’, The Daily Star. Available at http://
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2012/Oct-19/192077-march-14-calls-on-pm-mikati-to-
resign-after-hasan-killing.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016).
15 ‘ملاس مامت سيئرلا ةسائرب 73 مقر ةموكحلا ليكشت موسرم عقو ةيروهمجلا سيئر’ (The President of  the Republic signed a 
decree forming the 73rd government headed by Tammam Salam), Presidency of  the Council of  Ministeres. 
Available at http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=4909 (accessed 8 February 2016).
16 ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal (Lebanon)’, UNHCR.
17 Ibid.
18 ‘Agreement on the Regulation of  Transport of  Persons and Goods between the Lebanese Republic 
and the Syrian Arab Republic’, Syrian Lebanese Higher Council. Available at http://www.syrleb.org/docs/
agreements/05PERSONS_GOODSeng.pdf  (accessed 8 February 2016).
19 ‘Treaty of  Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between the Syrian Arab Republic and the 
Lebanese Republic’, United Nations Treaty Series. Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-
maker.un.org/files/LB-SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf  (accessed 8 
February 2016).
20 Naharnet Newsdesk, ‘Lebanese Authorities Discuss with U.N. Official New Border Controls with 
Syria’, an-Nahar. Available at http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/92038-lebanese-authorities-dis-
cuss-with-u-n-official-new-border-controls-with-syria (accessed 8 February 2016).
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Geographic proximity, familiarity with the local environment and loose border control 
were among the main factors influencing this. Along with the north, the Bekaa Valley 
became one of  the main areas hosting refugees, and as time went on all Lebanon became 
punctuated with settlements, with refugees also living in urban areas. Despite their preva-
lence, camps have never been officially approved by the Lebanese government as a viable 
hosting infrastructure.
Long transitional phases from one government to another and the absence of  political will 
to manage the crisis left a vacuum, within which international agencies, their local part-
ners and social networks have been operating constantly and relatively freely, managing 
the refugees’ presence.
In mid-2013, the country’s security situation was threatened by a series of  attacks against 
civilians which made many fear an incipient expansion of  the Syrian conflict into Leba-
non.21 Furthermore, Hezbollah had become openly involved in the Syrian conflict.22 In 
the spring and summer of  2013, the Battle of  al-Qusayr, between Hezbollah and the 
Syrian Arab Army on the one hand and factions of  the Syrian oppositions on the other 
became a turning point – the Syrian war was turning into a protracted conflict.23 It was 
only the beginning of  a long-term commitment by Hezbollah, which is still active in Syria 
at the time of  writing.
Within the context of  political uncertainty and exacerbated conflict, the question of 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon has never been at the top of  the political agenda, which has 
preserved Syrians from the politicisation of  their presence in Lebanon. 
In March 2014, Salam delivered his governmental policy statement to the Lebanese par-
liament, 24 which entrusted him with a confidence vote.25 In this, he declared his intention 
of  directly tackling the question of  Syrian refugees. In his own words:
The government will work on taking the necessary measures to address the issue 
of  Syrian refugees whose numbers exceed the country’s capacity to deal with, in 
order to contain the security, political, social and economic repercussion of  their 
temporary presence in Lebanon. The government will call upon the international 
21 ‘Suicide Attack Targets Shiite Town in Lebanon’, Al-Monitor. Available at http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2014/02/lebanon-fifth-suicide-attack.html (accessed 8 February 2016).
22 Until then Hezbollah’s operations in Syria were known but denied, but in May 2013 Secretary 
General Hassan Nasrallah openly admitted Hezbollah’s role in Syria. See Nicholas Blanford, ‘Why 
Hezbollah Has Openly Joined the Syrian Fight’, Christian Science Monitor. Available at http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0623/Why-Hezbollah-has-openly-joined-the-Syrian-fight 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
23 Not only Hezbollah has stakes in the Syrian battlefield; Lebanese Salafist networks also have connec-
tions with their Syrian counterparts.
24 ‘ةينطولا  ةحلصملا  ةموكحل  يرازولا  نايبلا’ (Ministerial Statement of  the Government of  National Interest), 
Presidency of  the Council of  Ministers, Republic of  Lebanon. Available at http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/
subpg.aspx?pageid=4896 (accessed 8 February 2016).
25 Hasan Lakkis and Hussein Dakroubl, ‘Salam: ‘Don’t Expect Miracles’ as Cabinet Wins Confidence 
Vote’, The Daily Star. Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Mar-
21/250915-salam-dont-expect-miracles-as-cabinet-wins-confidence-vote.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016).
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community and the Arab world to assume their responsibilities in helping Leba-
non fulfil its ethical and humanitarian obligation and at the same time facilitate 
their return to their homes.26 
It was the first time that the crisis had gained such a high political profile in Lebanon as 
part of  governmental policy. A ministerial source mentioned that this government had 
from the beginning intended to adopt a more proactive stance on the situation as part of 
its policy.27 
In May 2014, the number of  Syrians registered with the UNHCR reached 1 million, 
and uneasiness about the situation began to emerge.28 That month the government set up 
what it called an inter-ministerial Crisis Cell to oversee crisis management, headed by the 
Prime Minister and comprising the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and Migration, the Minis-
try of  Interior, the MoSA and, at a later stage, the GSO. These ministries were tasked with 
specific roles. The Ministry of  Interior and Municipalities is responsible for managing 
the situations of  refugees internally according to international standards. The Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs and Migrants was tasked with exploring the possibility of  establishing 
safe zones in Syria in order to relocate refugees. The MoSA is in charge of  coordinating 
relations with international organisations and local administrations.29 
In the summer of  2014, the Ministry of  Interior began monitoring border crossing activ-
ities and recorded about 18,000 Syrians travelling back and forth between Syria and 
Lebanon.30 Some political groups claimed that these Syrians were not entitled to a ref-
ugee status and its benefits, as they did not fear returning to their home country.31 As a 
consequence, the Minister of  Interior issued a new regulation that aimed at revoking the 
status of  ‘displaced’32 (nazih) of  those Syrians travelling back to their country. The effective 
application of  this regulation is however not confirmed.33
That June, the Syrian regime held its presidential elections with Syrians allowed to vote 
abroad, including in Lebanon, at local embassy offices. Rumours spread among Syri-
ans that voting was also a way to have their passport stamped by the Syrian authorities, 
26 ‘ةينطولا  ةحلصملا  ةموكحل  يرازولا  نايبلا’ (Ministerial Statement of  the Government of  National Interest), 
Republic of  Lebanon.
27 Interview with a Senior Advisor in the Ministry of  Interiors and Municipalities, Beirut (12 May 2015). 
28 ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal (Lebanon)’, UNHCR.
29 Council of  Ministers Decision No. 72 (23 March 2014).
30 Interview with a Senior Advisor in the Ministry of  Interiors and Municipalities, Beirut (12 May 2015). 
31 Maya Gebeily, ‘A Refugee on Paper: Running from War, Bureaucracy Could Be Syrians’ Greatest 
Obstacle’, Executive Magazine. Available at http://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-policy/ref-
ugee-paper (accessed 8 February 2016).
32 Jean Aziz, ‘Displaced Syrians Target of  New Lebanon Law’, Al-Monitor. Available at http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/lebanon-interior-ministry-decision-status-displaced-syrians.
html (accessed 8 February 2016).
33 Samya Kullab, ‘Lebanon Revises Open-Door Refugee Policy’, Al-Jazeera. Available at http://www.alja-
zeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/lebanon-revises-open-door-refugee-policy-201466744881995.
html (accessed 8 February 2016).
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implicitly symbolising loyalty to Bashar al-Assad, thus facilitating their return to Syria in 
the future or the renewal of  their passport.34 
At the time, tens of  thousands of  Syrians marched down the streets of  Beirut, many 
chanting in support of  al-Assad. This momentous disruption in Beirut35 made the Syrian 
presence more apparent than ever. Furthermore, it showed that the Syrians in Lebanon 
were more subject to politicisation than was generally expected. At that point, the refrain 
among many in Lebanon became that Syrians ‘cannot stay’. Another consideration that 
emerged was that, in contrast perhaps to the cases of  Turkey and Jordan, Syrians in Leb-
anon were probably far from being a homogenous anti-regime group and had potential 
to be mobilised by the Syrian regime. The reaction of  Lebanese critics of  al-Assad was 
harsh, with some even calling for the repatriation of  refugees that supported the regime.36
34 Reports on this matter are conflicting but show nevertheless a complex and contradictive electoral 
dynamic in favour of  al-Assad’s candidacy. See Cecily Hilleary, ‘Losing Election Not an Option for Syrian 
President’, Voice of  America. Available at http://www.voanews.com/content/losing-election-not-an-op-
tion-for-syrian-president/1926458.html (accessed 8 February 2016); ‘Amid Fear and Pressure Syrians 
Vote in ‘Blood Elections’’, Ya Libnan. Available at http://yalibnan.com/2014/06/03/amid-fear-pres-
sure-syrians-vote-blood-elections/ (accessed 8 February 2016); In Jordan the situation was similar, 
see: Elisa Oddone, ‘Syrians in Jordan Vote in Presidential Election’, Al-Ghad. Available at http://
www.alghad.com/articles/804854-Syrians-in-Jordan-vote-in-presidential-election?s=118438a8fe-
5bad208f932f03660c0659 (accessed 8 February 2016).
35 Jim Muir, ‘Syria Election: Refugees Vote in Lebanon and Jordan’, BBC News. Available at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27599868 (accessed 8 February 2016).
36 ‘March 14 Officials Request Deportation of  Pro-Assad Syrians’, Now Lebanon. Available at https://
now.mmedia.me/lb/en/lebanonnews/549157-march-14-officials-request-deportation-of-pro-as-
sad-syrians (accessed 8 February 2016).
Graph 1: Number of Syrian Refugees Registered with the UNHCR in Lebanon
Source: UNHCR, data range between 27/01/2012 and 31/12/2015
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In a conversation with the author, a public official from the Ministry of  Interior raised 
concerns that there may be ‘sleeping cells’ among Syrian refugees.37 Officials in the Leb-
anese international humanitarian community have described the situation following the 
reaching of  the 1 million refugee threshold and the presidential elections as a ‘wake-up 
call’, which changed the perception of  the Syrian presence in Lebanon.38 
In August 2014, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) undertook a military operation against 
Salafist groups operating in the border area of  Arsal (North-East of  Lebanon), which 
were expanding their influence from their territory in Syria. The objective of  the LAF was 
to regain control of  an area that was increasingly under the influence of  groups such as 
Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, which were spilling over from Syria.
During this operation at least 30 members of  the LAF and the Internal Security Forces 
(ISF) were abducted by Salafist groups. Some of  them were killed, while others remained 
in the hands of  their captors until 1 December 2015, when Qatar facilitated a controver-
sial prisoner swap between Lebanon and the kidnappers.39 At the time of  writing some 
of  the abducted soldiers and security forces are still detained by Syrian Islamist groups.
Consequently, the perception grew among some Lebanese political actors that there was 
a risk of  Syrian settlements becoming breeding grounds for Salafism in Lebanon. There 
is no historical precedent that would justify this concern regarding Syrians in particular, 
but nevertheless Arsal and surrounding areas – where the reality of  Syrian displacement 
overlaps with the peripheral repercussions of  the Syrian conflict – have since mid-2014 
become of  special security concern.40 
As a result of  these events, the perception of  refugees from Syria changed in economic, 
political, and security terms, and the Lebanese government began to adopt restrictive 
policies. The turning point was in October 2014, when the government unanimously 
approved a Policy Paper in which it laid down new measures for 2015.41
The Policy Paper came at the same time as a conference organised in Berlin to address 
the question of  Syrian displacement. The Lebanese Minister of  Foreign Affairs, Gebran 
Bassil, was particularly critical of  the initiative because the final document proposed at the 
conference, according to him, emphasised the host states’ responsibilities instead of  wid-
ening international support. Bassil even compared the situation to the Cairo Agreement 
37 Interview with a Senior Advisor in the Ministry of  Interiors and Municipalities, Beirut (12 May 2015).
38 Interview with a UN OCHA Officer, Beirut (8 May 2015); Interview with a Senior Advisor in the 
Ministry of  Interiors and Municipalities, Beirut (12 May 2015).
39 Bilal Y. Saab, ‘Lebanon’s Deal with the Devil: The Prisoner Swap with Jabhat Al Nusra’, Foreign 
Affairs. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/lebanon/2015-12-06/lebanons-deal-devil 
(accessed 8 February 2016). 
40 ‘Arsal Conflict’, Civil Society Knowledge Centre. Available at http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/securi-
ty-timeline/arsal-conflict-starting-august-2-2014 (accessed 8 February 2016).
41 ‘2014 لولأا نيرشت 23 ةسلج’ (Session of  23 October 2014), Presidency of  the Council of  Ministers (Republic of 
Lebanon). Available at http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=6118 (accessed 8 February 
2016).
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of  196942 when the Lebanese authorities acknowledged the status of  Palestinian groups 
operating in Lebanon and granted them the power to control the Palestinian refugee 
camps in the country.43 The Cairo Agreement is often considered a key factor in precipi-
tating Lebanon’s Civil War (1975) and also the Israeli invasion of  1982.
Lebanon’s revised policy towards the Syrian refugees was based on three aspects of  the 
Policy Paper. First, that Lebanon had done more than what was reasonably to be expected 
with regards to the refugee situation. Second, that Lebanon would enforce legislation to 
limit – and in fact end – the flow of  refugees in the country; and third, that measures 
would be adopted to reduce the numbers of  UNHCR registered Syrians in Lebanon.44
In December 2014, measures were adopted by the government and the GSO to enact 
the Policy Paper. From 5 January 2015, new criteria were introduced which effectively 
limited the ability of  Syrians to enter Lebanon. These measures slowed the flow of  refu-
gees into Lebanon – at least it appears so from official records; and they certainly made 
staying in the country even more challenging. Whether this course of  action positively 
affected Lebanon’s security and stability is another matter. In reality, it created an even 
more ambivalent status for refugees and increased segregation. 
According to operators working in refugee settlements, as well as from visits made to the 
settlements by the author, it seems that Syrians often cannot afford to renew documents 
and now refrain from leaving settlements because of  fear of  being arrested. This makes 
them more prone to negative coping strategies45 and more hostile to their host population. 
From early 2015 until the London pledging conference of  February 2016, the Leba-
nese political debate and policy towards Syrian refugees has remained fundamentally 
unchanged. Among the issues that emerged during that time, is the question of  the regis-
tration of  new-born babies from Syrian parents in Lebanon. 
Due to the complex legal process of  registration46 and the fact that many Syrians do 
not have the legal documents required or are afraid of  prosecution if  they approach 
Lebanese officials, many new-born babies remain unregistered – and therefore stateless. 
42 Wafiq Qanso, ‘نيحزانلا نيطوتل ةكرعم :نيلرب رمتؤم’ (Berlin Conference: The Battle for the Resettlement of 
Displaced People), Al-Akhbar. Available at http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/218660 (accessed 8 Febru-
ary 2016).
43 Fawwaz Trabulsi, A History of  Modern Lebanon, (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007), p. 154.
44 The paper included the commitment to maintain a high security alert on the situation and encour-
aged Syrian repatriation or resettlement in third countries by all available means. 
45 ‘Negative coping’ mechanisms or strategies are defined by most humanitarian organisations as those 
survival stratagems to which vulnerable people may resort, even though they may be illegal, morally rep-
rehensible and in the long-run damaging. These include prostitution, illegal employment, child labour, 
or theft. For an example of  the use of  this terminology see: http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/crisis/
46 Dalia Aranki, ‘Birth Registration Update: The Challenges of  Birth Registration in Lebanon for Ref-
ugees from Syria’, Norwegian Refugee Council. Available at http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9192872.pdf 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
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Lebanese political factions have quarrelled on the matter, with some political groups 
seeing registration as an attempt to ‘naturalise’ Syrians and give them the status of  Leb-
anese citizens.47
Also part of  the Lebanese debate on refugees is a proposal by authorities to set up camps 
in Syria to which refugees would be relocated,48 a plan which the Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs and Migrants was in charge of  assessing the feasibility of. Notwithstanding much 
advocacy for this measure, especially from the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Bas-
sil,49 the proposal was rejected by international organisations as a non-effective solution 
and one that would expose refugees to greater insecurity.50
The security situation in the North-East remains volatile, but at the time of  writing the 
LAF, supported by Hezbollah, has managed to prevail over attempts by Islamist factions to 
gain control of  territory in this area. In November 2015 two suicide attacks were carried 
out against civilians in Beirut, sharpening sectarian resentment and putting Hezbollah’s 
intervention in Syria under further scrutiny. 
Five years from the beginning of  the Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese situation remains 
volatile and uncertain. Lebanon has shifted from an ‘open door’ policy towards limiting 
access or even closing borders for Syrian refugees, while the permanence of  refugees in the 
country has been made increasingly difficult by new legal measures and insufficient funding. 
The Lebanese approach to the crisis has been characterised by unwillingness from the 
political elites to engage directly with the issue, for fear of  increasing polarisation in an 
already complex political landscape, and while the political process is at a stalemate. The 
critical level of  the crisis reached in mid-2014 subsequently prompted a revision of  this 
policy, precipitating the adoption of  restrictive measures. At the occasion of  the 2016 
London pledging conference for the Syrian crisis, Lebanon began to discuss the possibil-
ity of  softening measures towards refugees in exchange for more foreign aid. But it is too 
early to assess whether these new measures will effectively materialise.51 
47 Jean Aziz, ‘Lebanese, UN Fall out over Refugee Registration’, Al-Monitor. Available at http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/lebanon-syria-refugees-unhcr-gebran-bassil-rejection.html 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
48 ‘2014 لولأا  نيرشت 23 ةسلج’, Presidency of  the Council of  Ministers (Republic of  Lebanon). See also: ‘Leba-
non Foreign Minister Calls for Refugee Camps inside Syria’, The Daily Star. Available at http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jun-19/302888-lebanon-foreign-minister-calls-for-refu-
gee-camps-inside-syria.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016).
49 ‘Bassil Calls for Safe Zone inside Syria to House Refugees’, The Daily Star. Available at http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Oct-01/317196-bassil-calls-for-safe-zone-inside-syria-
to-house-refugees.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016).
50 Interview with a UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Beirut (14 May 2015). See also: Julian Borger, 
‘Syria Safe Zones Will Not End Need for Asylum in West, Un Refugee Head Warns’, The Guardian. 
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/syria-safe-zones-refugees-need-for-
asylum-in-west-un (accessed 8 February 2016).
51 ‘London Conference – Lebanon Statement of  Intent’, Support for Syrians Conference.
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Mapping the Political Dynamics of the Refugee Crisis: Risks 
of Politicising the Refugee Presence
The Lebanese political system relies on a consensual model of  power-sharing whereby 
major decisions have to be agreed on by all members of  government. In the vast majority 
of  cases, governments in Lebanon are national unity governments, proportionally repre-
senting all political parties, confessions and sects. According to this system, when a third 
of  the cabinet resigns or when at least one of  the main confessional groups or sects is not 
represented, the government is considered ‘unconstitutional’.52 
Although this system may have some advantages in preserving stability, it is an insur-
mountable obstacle when decisions need to be made. As a governmental source stated, 
the Lebanese system is highly dysfunctional in crisis management, its complications and 
equilibria are too cumbersome to react to fast-moving crises. The Syrian war, and the 
refugee crisis with it, are no exception, especially considering that it has taken place over 
the course of  three governmental transitions and the current long-term vacuum in the 
presidential office, with parliamentary elections postponed twice.53
Since 2011, the developments in Syria had been a source of  concern in Lebanon, where 
the political elite is split between pro and anti-Assad groups. The political groups that 
manifestly support the al-Assad regime include Hezbollah and Amal (based in the Shiʿa 
constituency), which are both part of  the March 8 Coalition. The Free Patriotic Move-
ment, a Christian party with the highest number of  seats in the Parliament, has a more 
complex stance, whereby it is allied with Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, but is historically 
opposed to the Syrian regime.
The March 14 coalition, on the other hand, is more or less overtly anti-Assad, and includes 
the Future Party and another minority component of  Christians. In between these groups, 
the Druze Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblat is against the Syrian regime, 
but oscillates between the two political poles of  March 8 and March 14. 
The political dynamics of  the Syrian refugee crisis can be divided into two main phases. 
The early stage was characterised by the perception among Lebanese critics of  the Syrian 
regime that the crisis in Syria would be short (as it appeared to be in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya 
and Yemen), while the second phase is characterised by the knowledge that this would not 
be the case.
52 This is generally known as the ‘blocking third’ mechanism, based on an interpretation of  the con-
stitution. See Articles 65(5), 69(1.b) to be read in conjunction with the provisional measures, especially 
Article 95(b). 
53 ‘Lebanon to Postpone Parliamentary Poll to 2017: Minister’, Reuters. Available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-lebanon-election-idUSKCN0I21BX20141013 (accessed 8 February 2016).
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During the first phase, representatives of  the Future movement – which relies on a Sunni 
constituency and leads the March 14 coalition – advocated a hospitable approach,54 call-
ing for solidarity as a moral duty. Speculatively, the refugee crisis was also an opportunity 
to highlight the consequences of  al-Assad’s repressions in the Lebanese context. Espe-
cially in this early stage, when numbers were still limited, the Sunni political component 
did not have strong incentives in opposing the presence of  Syrians in Lebanon. Possibly 
the presence of  a new, mainly Sunni and allegedly anti-Assad population was even per-
ceived as a future political asset.
The main political groups voicing concerns over the Syrian presence in Lebanon from 
the start were those representing the Christian constituency. Although this could have not 
been explicitly stated, the overwhelmingly Muslim identity of  Syrians raised concerns 
about a new sectarian structure emerging in Lebanon as result of  the crisis. This became 
most obvious for example when the Lebanese president at the time Michel Suleiman (by 
convention a Christian) addressed the UN General assembly in 2013 and defined the 
Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon as an ‘existential crisis’.55
Groups such as Hezbollah56 and Amal, but also the Progressive Socialist Party57 had to 
find a balance on an issue that challenged the alignment of  transnational solidarity con-
cerns, sectarian identity concerns, and political interests. Hezbollah acknowledged the 
obligation to support refugees in Lebanon,58 but also understood the problems that a long-
term presence might raise.
Concerns were reinforced by historical reference to the 2006 Lebanon-Israel War, when 
many Lebanese, above all from Shiʿa areas, found refuge in Syria.59 The memory of 
Syrian hospitality is still vivid and underpins a sense of  duty and transnational Muslim 
solidarity that goes beyond sectarian affiliations. In almost all conversations the author 
had during the course of  this research with NGOs, international organisations and 
civil society representatives, the example of  the 2006 war was brought up as a matter of 
reciprocation and solidarity between communities. Sources in the Lebanese international 
community have repeatedly highlighted how Hezbollah has stressed the humanitarian 
character of  the crisis, therefore trying to isolate it from sectarianism and politicisation.
54 ‘Future Movement Calls on Govt to House Syrian Refugees’, The Daily Star. Available at http://
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Feb-06/162335-future-movement-asks-govt-to-house-syri-
an-refugees.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016 ).
55 Timothy Witcher, ‘Lebanon Faces Social Explosion over Syria Refugees: UN’, UNHCR. Available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=5243d07c5 (accessed 8 Feb-
ruary 2016).
56 Nasser Chararah, ‘Hezbollah Plans Aid for Syrian Refugees’, Al-Monitor. Available at http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/lebanon-hezbollah-syrian-refugee.html (accessed 8 
February 2016).
57 ‘Future Movement Calls on Govt to House Syrian Refugees’, The Daily Star.
58 ‘Hezbollah Sends First Aid Delegation to Refugees’ , The Daily Star. Available at http://www.unhcr.
org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=504ecad15 (accessed 8 February 2016).
59 ‘Lebanon’s Syria Refugee Move Prompts Media Concern’, BBC News. Available at http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30682185 (accessed 8 February 2016).
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The second phase began months later, when it became obvious that the Syrian crisis would 
be long-term. The fact that Hezbollah and al-Assad’s regime prevailed in the Qusayr battle 
of  mid-2013 has been considered a watershed by many, after which the Lebanese political 
elites critical of  al-Assad moderated their expectations of  the outcome of  the conflict. In 
addition to this, the magnitude of  the crisis was reaching entirely unexpected proportions. 
Consequently, the question of  sustainability and confessional balances became relevant. 
During this second phase the Future Movement seemed to develop a different perception 
of  the crisis, the Christian groups took harsher stances, and Hezbollah raised its alert on 
the security implications of  the Syrian presence in Lebanon, especially regarding border 
areas such as Arsal.
In March 2014, for example, President Michel Suleiman shifted from defining the situa-
tion as an ‘existential crisis’ to ‘existential threat’.60 Lebanese media reported an increasing 
number of  declarations by Christian political leaders and members of  government evoking 
a ‘conspiracy’ against them.61 In these declarations, the Syrian presence is associated with 
unemployment, increased consumption of  electricity, a rise in cost of  living,62 crime,63 and 
insecurity. The Lebanese foreign minister Gebran Bassil, a leading voice in the Free Patri-
otic Movement, has been among the main opponents to the Syrian presence in Lebanon.64 
The main policy shift within the Future Movement became evident when the Minister of 
Interior Nohad Machnouk began to adopt a more critical stance towards the status of  refu-
gees in Lebanon in mid-2014.65 At a later stage, the Ministry of  Interior promoted measures 
to withdraw the status of  refugees from those Syrians that were still regularly travelling 
between Lebanon and Syria. 66 Furthermore, in meetings with municipal administrators 
60 ‘Address by His Excellency the President of  the Republic of  Lebanon, General Michel Sleiman at 
the 25th Arab Summit ‘, Presidency of  the Republic. Available at http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/
Pages/SpeechesDetails.aspx?nid=22892 (accessed 8 February 2016).
61 Pia Francis and Hanan Khaledl, ‘Aoun Warns of  ‘Conspiracy’ to Settle Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, 
The Daily Star. Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-15/315335-
aoun-warns-of-conspiracy-to-settle-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016).
62 ‘Syria Crisis Has Cost Lebanon $20 Bn: Minister’, Agence France Presse. Available at http://www.
unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=54990d558 (accessed 8 February 2016).
63 ‘Syrian Refugees Causing Crime Rate to Increase in Lebanon’, MTV Lebanon. Available at http://
mtv.com.lb/news/english_highlights/414272/syrian_refugees_causing_crime_rate_to_increase_in_
lebanon (accessed 
64 ‘Bassil Warns of  ‘Strife’ over Syria Refugee Crisis’, Now Lebanon. Available at https://now.mmedia.
me/lb/en/archive/554427-bassil-warns-against-permanent-syrian-refugee-presence (accessed 8 Feb-
ruary 2016); Naharnet Newsdesk, ‘Bassil Warns of  Catastrophic Effects of  Refugee Crisis’, an-Nahar. 
Available at http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/190552 (accessed 8 February 2016).
65 ‘March 14 Officials Request Deportation of  Pro-Assad Syrians’, Now Lebanon. Available at https://
now.mmedia.me/lb/en/lebanonnews/549157-march-14-officials-request-deportation-of-pro-as-
sad-syrians (accessed 8 February 2016).
66 Elise Knutsen, ‘Security Fears Prompted Review of  Syrian Refugees: Machnouk’, The Daily Star. 
Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jun-02/258507-security-fears-
prompted-review-of-syrian-refugees-machnouk.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016).
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and humanitarian officials, it has been reported to the author that the autochthonous 
Sunni communities began to complain to their political patrons that the Syrian presence 
was incurring unsustainable costs in social, economic and cultural terms. Most of  the ref-
ugee population tends to settle in the poorest areas, where small, unequipped, and often 
poor municipalities have had to deal with a vastly increased – sometimes doubled – popu-
lation, while demands for waste and sewage management and the provision of  electricity 
and water consumption become unmanageable. 
Neither has coexistence always been smooth at the social level. Although there are no offi-
cial numbers, various sources have reported an increase in divorces or polygamy, pointing 
to the presence of  a young and mostly female population in the country as a cause.67 In 
most of  the cases, official authorities do not record these new marriages nor the children 
born out of  them, who risk remaining unregistered and becoming stateless. Marriage has 
become an example of  negative coping mechanisms for some Syrian refugee families, 
who reduce their costs by ‘marrying off ’ family members to the local, more affluent pop-
ulation. Reportedly this practice has also involved under-age girls.68 
The emergence of  such concerns, within the Sunni constituency as well, have put under 
pressure even those political groups and patrons who initially were not worried about 
sectarian imbalance. They most likely began to recognise the high political cost attached 
to the open-border policy of  before mid-2014 and, consequently, aligned themselves with 
the tougher measures enacted in January 2015.
Despite Hezbollah maintaining an overall humanitarian approach to the crisis and being 
the dominant political and military power in many areas hosting Syrian refugees, they 
have also grown more alert to security implications. Arsal is the key example of  this. Here, 
the Salafist movements active in Syria against both the regime and Hezbollah have estab-
lished a presence, opening an internal front. On several occasions, Hezbollah has called 
for the relocation of  Syrian civilians so that they could intervene militarily in the area,69 
but there has been political division on what kind of  intervention could occur. The Minis-
try of  Interior, for example, has criticised Hezbollah on several occasions.70
The divisiveness of  the refugee presence in Lebanese political dynamics is also exemplified 
by the question of  the establishment of  camps. Refugee camps are a last resort measure in 
refugee crisis management but have been adopted as a long-term policy for housing part 
67 Interview with a UN OCHA Officer, Beirut (6 May 2015). 
68 Olivia Alabaster, ‘The Challenges Facing Young Women Refugees’, Wafmag.org. Available at http://
wafmag.org/2015/11/challenges-facing-young-women-refugees/ (accessed 8 February 2016). ‘News 
Brief ’, Universite Sain-Joseph. Available at http://www.sciences-po.usj.edu.lb/pdf/News%20Brief%20
Too%20Young%20To%20Wed.pdf  (accessed 8 February 2016).
69 Jean Aziz, ‘Nasrallah Warns of  Impending Arsal Battle’, Al-Monitor. Available at http://www.al-mon-
itor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/lebanon-hezbollah-nasrallah-battle-qalamoun-arsal-isis.html 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
70 Naharnet Newsdesk, ‘Mashnouq Responding to Qassem: He Wants to Destroy Arsal, Not Liberate 
It’, an-Nahar. Available at http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/179877-mashnouq-responding-qas-
sem-he-wants-to-destroy-arsal-not-liberate-i (accessed 8 February 2016).
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of  the refugee population in both Jordan and Turkey.71 Since the very beginning of  the 
crisis, the political debate in Lebanon gauged the opportunity to build refugee camps. The 
Future movement hinted about this possibility at the beginning of  the crisis,72 believing 
it to be an efficient way of  dealing with the situation. Governmental sources close to the 
Future Movement noted that housing Syrians in camps would be ‘less bad’ than them 
living on the streets, in parking lots and other areas. Small and manageable camps have 
been considered an option worth exploring for crisis management.73
Nevertheless, refugee camps in Lebanon have a long and tragic history, awakening mem-
ories of  the Lebanese Civil War and the present reality of  Palestinian camps. These have 
become a symbol of  segregation for Palestinians and are also the symptom of  a fragile 
state, being perceived as almost extra-territorial entities, sources of  insecurity, radicalisa-
tion and armed groups.74 With this in mind, both Christian groups and Hezbollah have 
clearly stated their aversion to the establishment of  camps for Syrians.75 
Those who oppose a policy of  camps do so mainly because they want to prevent his-
tory from repeating itself  in Lebanon. But those who see camps as a option consider the 
analogy between the Syrian and Palestinian cases historically flawed. This is the most 
benevolent interpretation – less official views claim that the interest in building camps is 
related to the idea that they may turn into long-term settlements and be sources of  polit-
ical support for those who protected them.
From a phase in which no political consensus was possible and therefore the crisis was left 
unmanaged, mid-2014 saw parties align towards a restrictive policy towards the Syrian 
presence, although Amal and Hezbollah did express criticism towards these measures.76 
Still, a minimal consensus allowed for the new Policy Paper of  October 2014 to be imple-
mented in January 2015. Developments in Syria and political tensions in Lebanon will 
shape the next stages of  the refugee crisis. Syrians, as a result of  the 2015 restrictive 
measures, are increasingly vulnerable, while Lebanese political reactions reflect social and 
political tensions exacerbated by the uncertainty of  the Syrian civil war. 
71 Lewis Turner, ‘Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of  Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the 
Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan’, Mediterranean Politics (2015). 
72 ‘Future Movement to Build Syrian Refugee Camp’, Now Lebanon. Available at https://now.mmedia.
me/lb/en/nownews/future_movement_to_build_syrian_refugee_camp (accessed 8 February 2016).
73 Interview with a Senior Advisor in the Ministry of  Interiors and Municipalities, Beirut (12 May 2015). 
74 Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of  Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
75 ‘Hezbollah Rejects Syrian Refugee Camps in Lebanon’, The Daily Star. Available at http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Mar-10/166204-hezbollah-rejects-syrian-refugee-camps-in-leb-
anon.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016). 
76 ‘نييروسلا ةريشأت يف رظنلا ةداعإ وحن’ (Reconsiderations of  Syrian Visas), Al-Akbar. Available at http://www.
al-akhbar.com/node/223781 (accessed 8 February 2016).
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Who is a Refugee in Lebanon? Aliens, ‘Displaced’ and 
Refugees
Lebanon is not party to the 1951 convention on refugees77 and does not employ a legal 
definition of  refugee nor a legal framework that regulates their presence and status.78 
There is, on paper, an inter-institutional committee in charge of  adjudicating political 
asylum requests,79 and political asylum is regulated by title VIII of  the ‘Law Regulating 
the Entry to, Stay in and Exit from Lebanon’ of  10 July 1962.80 However its application is 
limited to requests for political asylum only, and its effectiveness is not confirmed. 
In 2003 the Lebanese government signed a memorandum of  understanding to address 
the status of  refugees in Lebanon, which in theory is still valid. Nevertheless, the docu-
ment has remained largely unapplied and its consequences have not been felt by Syrians 
in Lebanon.81
As with previous refugee populations such as the Palestinians and the Iraqis,82 the legal 
status of  Syrians in Lebanon currently lies in a grey area between ‘alien’,83 ‘displaced’ 
(nazih) and ‘de facto refugee’. The government has constantly steered away from the inter-
nationally acknowledged notion of  ‘refugee’, fearing to undertake obligations such a 
status can demand.84
77 ‘The 1951 Refugee Convention’, UNHCR. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.
html (accessed 8 February 2016).
78 Although in some parts of  the legislation the term ‘refugee’ is used (see for example Law 10 of 
July 1962, Article 19). See ‘1962 زومت 10 هيف هرداصنم جورخلاو هيف ةماقلااو نانبل ىلا لوخدلا ميظنت نوناق’ (Law to regu-
late access to Lebanon, Residency and Exit, 10 July 1962), Ministry of  Justice (Republic of  Lebanon). 
Available at http://ahdath.justice.gov.lb/law-nearby-Foreigners.htm (accessed 8 February 2016). In this 
context the definition of  refugee is limited to political refugee. The same piece of  legislation also refers 
to asylum procedures (Articles 26-31)
79 The committee is composed by the Minister of  Interior, the Directors of  Justice, Foreign Affairs and 
General Security. 
80 ‘Law of  July 1962: Concerning the Entry and Stay in Lebanon as Well as the Exit’, Ministry of  Justice 
(Republic of  Lebanon). Available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/39234/97115/
F1369890137/LBN-39234.pdf  (accessed 8 February 2016).
81 Suzan Akram, ‘Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies and Global Responsibility Sharing’, St 
Joseph University, Oxford University, UNHCR. Available at http://www.bu.edu/law/files/2015/07/
FINALFullReport.pdf  (accessed 8 February 2016). According to some interpretations the Memoran-
dum does not apply to cases of  mass displacement and that is why it is not applied to the Syrian situation.
82 Souheil al-Natour, ‘The Legal Status of  Palestinians in Lebanon’, Journal of  Refugee Studies 10 (1997). 
The question of  whether Palestinians in Lebanon are considered in accord with international legal 
standards is disputed, they are more commonly defined as ‘special foreigners’.
83 Much of  the legal conditions for aliens to entry and exit Lebanon is regulated by Law 10 of  July 
1962, its implementing decrees and various amendments. 
84 This does not mean that the Lebanese state has been necessarily averse to refugee rights in general, 
by looking at the current crisis and the Iraqi crisis it can be seen that at least some of  the fundamental 
obligations related to refugee status, such as non-refoulement, have been respected overall.
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Until January 2015, no specific legislation had been issued to regulate the status of  Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon, thus they were subject to the ordinary legislation regulating the 
entrance and stay of  aliens. Their additional agreement via the bilateral Treaty of  Broth-
erhood, Cooperation and Coordination that, until 2015, regulated the movement of  the 
two peoples, made it even easier for Syrians to cross the border.
In addition to the ordinary legal provisions, other denominations have begun to emerge in 
the political debate. ‘Displaced’ (nazih) and ‘de facto refugee’ are the main terms that have 
emerged. They constitute ad hoc categories that have been defined only vaguely. 
As a governmental source explained, the term ‘displaced’ has been intended in this con-
text exclusively in its literal meaning: someone being forced out of  his or her usual place 
of  residence, with no reference to international legal standards.85 Another governmental 
source spoke of  how the whole definitional issue was symptomatic of  the government 
and international organisations being unable to agree on the correct status of  Syrians in 
Lebanon. ‘De facto refugee’ was a temporary solution to this confusion – a definition which 
can now be found in documents such as the 2015 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, referring 
to those Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR.86
This rather complex situation has created two main groups of  Syrians in Lebanon. The 
first includes those who enjoy the sponsorship of  a Lebanese employer. Those generally 
do not have major problems entering and staying in the country, so long as they provide 
an ID at the border and have the necessary documentation concerning their employment 
status. As long as they can afford the renewal of  their permits, and as long as they remain 
employed, their stay in Lebanon is lawful.87 The same applies to Syrians with sufficient 
and certified funds such as businesspersons, owners of  real estate in Lebanon, or those in 
possession of  a regular rent agreement. 
The second group includes those Syrians who came to Lebanon to escape the conflict (the 
displaced or nazihin) but do not enjoy sponsorship via employment and do not fall in any of 
the aforementioned categories. Until 2015, they were subject to the ordinary visa scheme 
that applies to all aliens, which grants a six-month period of  stay, renewable thereafter for 
a yearly fee.88 
85 Interview with a Senior Advisor to the Ministry of  Social Affairs, Beirut (12 May 2015).
86 ‘Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016’, UNOCHA. Available at http://www.unocha.org/cap/
appeals/lebanon-crisis-response-plan-2015-2016 (accessed 8 February 2016). On the legal status of  de 
facto refugees see: William Thomas Worster, ‘The Evolving Definition of  the Refugee in Contemporary 
International Law’, Berkeley Journal of  International Law 30, no. 1 (2012).
87 In the past months there has been shortage of  agricultural workers and exceptionally the GSO has 
guaranteed temporary access with no need for documentation to those Syrians that crossed the bor-
ders declaring their intent to work in Lebanese agriculture on a seasonal basis. Conversation with ILO 
Lebanon Officer. See Mohammed Zaatari, ‘Lebanon Farms Reel from Shortage of  Syrian Laborers’, 
The Daily star. 
88 Mary Ann Perkins and Tuesday Reitano, ‘Exploring the Status of  Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, 
Columbia SIPA. Available at http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/exploring-status-syrian-refu-
gees-lebanon/#_ftnref3 (accessed 8 February 2016).
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All Syrians could register with the UNHCR through a prima facie89 registration process 
that included a short interview along with other formalities, and be given access to the aid 
provided by the UNHCR according to their specific needs. 
With the implementation of  the new regulations,90 those entering Lebanon from Syria 
were divided into seven categories each containing several sub-categories. The first cat-
egory includes those travelling for tourism, work, trade, and ownership or rent of  real 
estate. In each of  these cases and upon provision of  several documents, Syrians are given 
temporary residence permits. Category 2 allows entrance for study, and Category 3 allows 
transit to the airport or maritime ports upon provision of  documentation showing the 
purpose of  travel. In these cases short-term temporary permits are granted.
Category 4 explicitly says that Syrians with the ‘status of  displaced’ (nazih) are not to be 
admitted in Lebanon, with two exceptions: those previously registered as ‘displaced’ and 
those that meet certain conditions set by the MoSA. Qualifying for these exceptions is 
difficult. The conditions for humanitarian admittance set by the MoSA are strict, only 
applying to minors, disabled people who have already been resettled in other countries, 
and those who are in need of  life-saving health treatment.91 Furthermore, the actual 
implementation of  these conditions is dependent on the presence of  MoSA staff  at the 
border, which has not been confirmed to the author. In fact, according to a ministerial 
source, between January 2015 and May 2015 only ten people have been guaranteed a 
‘displaced’ status on a humanitarian basis.92 
Categories 5 and 6 allow entrance into Lebanon for medical reasons as well as access to 
embassies. Category 7 allows Syrians to enter Lebanon on the basis of  ‘prior liability com-
mitment’ to a Lebanese employer. This category also includes subcategories. It allows Syrians 
short visits upon invitation by a Lebanese national, visits to obtain permissions to work, and 
visits to family relations in Lebanon who are in possession of  a regular working permit. 
What is most important is that, as part of  the new 2015 policy, other criteria have been added 
making it harder and more expensive to renew permissions to stay in Lebanon.93 The new cri-
teria demand of  all Syrians to provide official documents confirming their place of  residence. 
89 For a discussion of  Prima Facie recognition refugee status see: Guidelines on International Protection No. 11: 
Prima Facie Recognition of  Refugee Status (Geneva: UNHCR, 2015).
90 ‘هيف ةماقلإاو نانبل ىلإ نّييروّسلا لوخد ميظنت نع نلاعإ’ (Announcement to Regulate Syrians’ Entry to and Resi-
dence in Lebanon), General Security Office (GSO). Available at http://general-security.gov.lb/news_det.
aspx?d=194 (accessed 8 February 2016). 
91 According to a UNHCR Document: ‘Four categories of  persons are presently being considered by 
the MoSA for inclusion in the humanitarian exceptions. These are: 1. Unaccompanied/separated chil-
dren (under 16 years old) whose parents/legal guardians are confirmed to be displaced in Lebanon; 
2. Persons with disabilities dependent on family/relatives confirmed to be displaced in Lebanon; 3. 
Persons needing life-saving medical treatment not usually available in Syria, or not available in a timely 
manner; and, 4. Individuals pursuing resettlement or transitioning through Lebanon to a third country, 
with proof  of  onward travel outside Lebanon.’ UNHCR Lebanon Humanitarian Admission (30 June 2015).
92 Interview with a Senior Advisor to the Ministry of  Social Affairs, Beirut (12 May 2015).
93 ‘هيف ةماقلإاو نانبل ىلإ نّييروّسلا لوخد ميظنت نع نلاعإ’ (Announcement to Regulate Syrians’ Entry to and Resi-
dence in Lebanon), General Security Office (GSO). Particularly the final section of  the document: ‘notes’.
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Those Syrians who are working also have to present certificates of  employment for visa 
renewal. Those who do not work and are registered with the UNHCR are also required to 
present a legalised pledge document in which they declare that they will not take any job 
positions. These documents are expensive; the UNHCR has calculated that an average 
family of  five has to spend 1,375 US Dollars for a one-year stay.94 
Only recently have there been talks within the Lebanese political sphere about the possi-
bility of  giving all Syrians the right to work in labour intensive sectors and to renew their 
visa for free, depending on the availability of  international aid.95
In contrast to the complex domestic situation, from an international standpoint, Syri-
ans enjoy full refugee status. The UNCHR has granted prima facie recognition of  refugee 
status to Syrians and this has allowed them to benefit from the services and protection 
that the UNHCR can provide with the collaboration of  its subsidiary agencies. Those 
Syrians that reach the UNHCR registration premises and go through the due formalities, 
including a short interview, are given identification documents that confirm their status. 
These documents need to be renewed or checked after a period of  time, but the status of 
refugee is not subject to time limits unless if  the situation changes in the country of  origin, 
or it is cancelled or revoked according to UNHCR regulations.96 Additionally, even after 
the suspension of  registration in May 2015, Syrians could still have been logged in the 
UNHCR’s internal database.97 
In conclusion, the status of  Syrians in Lebanon is particularly complex. The state has 
shifted from the applying ordinary legislation on aliens’ entry to the implementation 
of  special regulation in early 2015, which has rendered access to and stay in Lebanon 
increasingly difficult for Syrians. As a result, since late 2014, the number of  Syrians cross-
ing into Lebanon has significantly decreased – at least according to UNHCR registration 
numbers – while their status has become increasingly ambivalent and vulnerable due to 
the restrictive nature of  the new provisions. 
94 ‘February Monthly Dashboard’, UNHCR (2015). Similar analyses are also to be found in: ‘Lebanon: 
Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon’, Amnesty International. 
Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1785/2015/en/ (accessed 8 February 
2016); ‘I Just Wanted to Be Treated Like a Person’, Human Rights Watch. Available at https://www.
hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-be-treated-person/how-lebanons-residency-rules-facili-
tate-abuse (accessed 8 February 2016).
95 Conversation with Senior Advisor to the Ministry of  Interior (3 February 2016). See also ‘London 
Conference – Lebanon Statement of  Intent’, Support for Syrians Conference.
96 ‘Note on the Cancellation of  Refugee Status’, UNHCR. Available at http://www.refworld.org/
docid/41a5dfd94.html (accessed 8 February 2016). 
97 Interview with UNHCR Officials and Field Visit to UNHCR Registration Centre, Tripoli (27 May 
2015).
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The Role of International Organisations and Municipalities: 
Filling the State Vacuum
With the refugee crisis growing so fast and within political vacuums, how is it possible that 
its repercussions have been relatively limited thus far? When reflecting on the relative sta-
bility of  Lebanon in a regional context of  unprecedented turmoil, part of  the explanation 
is that the reception of  refugees in Lebanon did not take place in a complete institutional 
vacuum. Over and above Lebanese state institutions, international organisations (IOs)
have played a significant role in coordinating humanitarian intervention. As previously 
observed, the unwillingness of  the Lebanese government to act has allowed international 
organisations to operate with a relative degree of  autonomy. 
Since the beginning, the UN has implemented a humanitarian programme – one which 
turned into one of  the biggest humanitarian operations ever realised by the UN.98 The 
leading agency in the operation is the UNHCR, along with its partner organisations. 
Since 2012, the UNHCR has implemented six programmes under the banner of  the 
Syrian Regional Response Plan (RRP),99 which addressed the humanitarian needs of  the 
Syrian population, displaced outside the borders of  Syria within neighbouring countries. 
In 2015 the programme expanded and became the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 
(3RP), which also included developmental objectives for the autochthonous communities 
hosting refugees. The 3RP programme for Lebanon goes under the title of  the ‘Lebanon 
Crisis Response Plan’, and to date there have been two main projects for 2015 and 2016.100 
The overall objective has been to increase the resilience of  host communities as well as 
that of  refugees considering longer-term perspectives on the crisis.
Below the level of  state institutions, local administrations and civil society groups have 
played a fundamental role in tempering the impact of  refugee presence on the every-
day life of  host communities. In particular, the municipalities, local branches of  justice 
administration offices, as well as local education and healthcare institutions, have become 
the real reception structures for hundreds of  thousands of  refugees. The pressure of  the 
Syrian presence has affected these local realities, whose capacities were already limited. 
All statistics confirm that Syrian refugees tend to live in the poorest areas of  Lebanon, with 
25% of  Lebanon’s population already living under the local poverty line of  four US Dol-
lars a day.101 This has exacerbated social imbalance and competition for resources among 
the poorest sectors of  Lebanese society and Syrian refugees.
98 ‘UN Launches Biggest Humanitarian Appeal, Fearing Deepening of  Syrian Crisis’, UNHCR. Avail-
able at http://www.unhcr.org/52aeee8e9.html (accessed 8 February 2016). 
99 ‘2014 Syria Regional Response Plan’, UNHCR. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/ 
(accessed 8 February 2016).
100 ‘3rp 2016-2017’, UNHCR. Available at http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/the-3rp/lebanon/ (accessed 
8 February 2016).
101 ‘World Development Indicators’, World Bank. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/leb-
anondata.worldbank.org/country/lebanon (accessed 8 February 2016).
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Figure 1: Map of Most Vulnerable Cadasters of Lebanon and Syrian Refugee Presence
Source 3RP Dashboard December 2015 (Projections)
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The humanitarian response plan, launched by the UN and its partners, entitled Syrians to 
receive services and economic support, which at least some poorer Lebanese have not been 
receiving from their own government. One example is secondary healthcare, which was 
provided to Syrians, but which Lebanese can access only in their own private capacity, not 
as a public service.
This has put under pressure those political groups who dealt with the recriminations of  poor 
Lebanese witnessing that the humanitarian emergency plan was supplying Syrian refugees’ 
needs more effectively than the Lebanese government addressed those of  its own citizens. 
As a consequence of  this increased sense of  relative deprivation, the UN has expanded 
the focus of  its action. Until 2014, the main focus of  its operations was humanitarian and 
primarily managed by the UNHCR. From 2015, with the establishment of  the Lebanon 
Resilience and Response Plan,102 international cooperation in the country has expanded 
its focus to local development as a key factor of  crisis management. 
It is still too early to assess the consequences, but assuming that sufficient funding is made 
available, this broader scope of  action may address the most urgent issues that local 
municipalities face when coping with their own infrastructural deficiency. 
Matching development objectives with humanitarian relief  may have the positive effect 
of  turning crisis management into a development opportunity for Lebanon. Nevertheless, 
it should also be acknowledged that systemic development projects in Lebanon, such as 
the reconstruction of  Beirut in the aftermath of  the civil war, have failed to bring about 
significant social, political and infrastructural development for the state.103 Thus caution 
is advised in undertaking grand developmental initiatives in the absence of  a capable, 
transparent, and accountable governance. 
The role of  municipalities and local administrations has not constantly been constructive.104 
In various cases, at times when tensions have peaked, municipalities have become the 
means to implement restrictive measures targeting Syrian refugees, spurred by perceptions 
of  insecurity and general social fatigue. For example, some municipalities implemented 
local curfews for Syrians or adopted other security measures to reduce both the mobility 
and sense of  security of  Syrians in Lebanon.105 
102 ‘3rp 2016-2017’, UNHCR.
103 This has been widely documented and discussed for example in the works of  Pierre Gaspard, A 
Political Economy of  Lebanon, 1948-2002: The Limits of  Laissez-Faire Social, Economic and Political Studies of  the 
Middle East (Netherlands: Brill, 2004); Reinoud Leenders, Spoils of  Truce: Corruption and State-Building in 
Postwar Lebanon (Ithaca: Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Tom Najem, Lebanon: The Politics of  a 
Penetrated Society (London, New York: Routledge, 2012). 
104 Nayla Geagea, ‘Asylum Crisis or Migrant Labor Crisis?’, LCPS. Available at http://www.lcps-leba-
non.org/featuredArticle.php?id=42 (accessed 8 February 2016).
105 Maya el-Helou, ‘Refugees under Curfew: The War of  Lebanese Municipalities against the Poor’, 
The Legal Agenda. Available at http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=674&folder=ar-
ticles&lang=en (accessed 8 February 2016); ‘Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on 
Syrian Refugees’, Human Rights Watch. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/leba-
non-least-45-local-curfews-imposed-syrian-refugees (accessed 8 February 2016).
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The autonomy given to municipalities has also allowed for fragmented management of  the 
crisis, leading to Syrians being treated differently in different municipalities of  Lebanon.
International organisations, local administrations, and civil society groups have consti-
tuted the main source of  Lebanon’s resilience to this unprecedented crisis. Their capacity 
to cope with the situation, nevertheless, is entirely dependent on the support that they 
receive from donors as well as cooperation with the central government. It is therefore 
vital that international organisations, as well as local groups and administrations, keep 
receiving all the support they need to supply services to both refugees and host communi-
ties, since this is a key stabiliser for a disruptive phenomenon.
The Broader Context of Syria-Lebanon Migrations: Uncertain 
Borders, Contested Statehoods and Economic Imbalances
The fast developing phenomenon of  mass displacement from Syria to Lebanon is not 
only explained by the conflict’s ferocity, its destructive consequences, and the geographic 
proximity of  Lebanon to Syria. It has other broader causes. 
Lebanon and Syria have a historical relationship, which has determined the porousness of 
the border. The birth and development of  Lebanon itself  is the result of  a process whereby 
the country’s territory was carved out a unified ‘Greater Syria’. Since then, Pan-Arabism 
has posed both external and internal challenges for Lebanese sovereignty. The 1958 civil 
unrest, the 1975-1989 Lebanese Civil War, Syria’s military presence in Lebanon from 
1976 to 2005 and the phase of  the so-called Pax Syriana licensed by the Taif  Agreement 
of  1989106 are only some of  the most obvious instances where the uncertain nature of  the 
border has been manifested. These are further confirmed by the fact that Syria opened its 
first diplomatic mission in Lebanon only in 2008107 following the withdrawal of  its forces 
in 2005 – a result of  internal and international pressure epitomised by the UNSC reso-
lution 1554. Furthermore the border between Syria and Lebanon is, in legal terms, still 
being demarcated.108
But history and international law are only one angle of  the phenomenon. There are 
political, social, and economic relations that have made the border between Syria and 
Lebanon exceptionally porous. As a direct consequence of  a fundamental lack of  recog-
nition from the Syrian regime of  Lebanon’s sovereignty, the former has often exercised 
much influence in Lebanese politics, often relying on sympathising Lebanese elites and 
parties. The main refrain among Syrian and Lebanese supporters of  the idea of  ‘Greater 
106 ‘Taif  Agreement’, The Lebanese Parliament. Available at https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.
un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf  (accessed 8 February 2016). 
107 Ian Black, ‘Syria to Open Embassy in Beirut after Historic Decree’, The Guardian. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/15/syria-lebanon (accessed 8 February 2016). 
108 Nizar Abdel-Kader and Alexander Ramsbotham, ‘Boundaries and Demarcation’, Accord 24 (2012). 
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Syria’ is ‘one people two countries’109 which has been recently paraphrased by the Leba-
nese Foreign Minister Bassil as ‘two peoples in one state’,110 with reference to the Syrian 
refugee presence in Lebanon. 
Lebanon’s signing of  the bilateral Treaty of  Brotherhood and Cooperation with Syria111 
effectively brought the two countries even closer, allowing Syrians and Lebanese to cross 
without the need for a visa or even a passport. Although the wording of  the agreements is 
vague and the implementation of  the measures is only partial, they clearly point to a spe-
cial treatment of  Syrian migrants in Lebanon, where their migration is greatly facilitated 
and their status protected in comparison to others.112
Syrians have also presented a reserve of  labour for the Lebanese economy for decades. 
The fluid border and the informality of  employment makes it difficult to find statistics on 
this phenomenon, but it is widely believed that in past decades hundreds of  thousands 
of  seasonal and construction workers from Syria have come to Lebanon as economic 
migrants. Figures oscillate, some sources estimate that there are between half  a million 
and one million Syrians working in Lebanon,113 while the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) estimates a figure between 200,000 and 600,000.114 The Syrian labour force 
constitutes an important economic resource, and it is no surprise that the recent restric-
tions at border crossings have caused complaints in the agricultural sector. 115
Economic imbalances between Lebanon and Syria are a possible explanation for this 
phenomenon. In Lebanon the currency is pegged to the US Dollar and has a stronger pur-
chasing power than the Syrian Pound. Lebanon’s economy is also generally service-based 
and capital intensive.116 The difference between the economies is even starker at the time 
of  writing, when the Syrian economy is going through unprecedented challenges.117
Thus, those Lebanese who have access to a more competitive educational infrastructure 
have more often joined the highly skilled and capital intensive service sectors such as 
trade, banking, business, tourism, education, medicine or engineering. Legislation is in 
109 ‘Lebanese, Syrians One People in Two Countries: Syrian Ambassador’, The Daily Star. Available at 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-09/283518-lebanese-syrians-one-peo-
ple-in-two-countries-syrian-ambassador.ashx (accessed 8 February 2016).
110 ‘Bassil: Refugees Threaten Lebanon’s Existence’, The Daily Star. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/
cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=524917555 (accessed 8 February 2016).
111 ‘Treaty of  Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between the Syrian Arab Republic and the 
Lebanese Republic’, United Nations Treaty Series. 
112 For a more detailed chronicle of  economic migration from Syria to Lebanon see John T. Chalcraft, 
The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009).
113 ‘Labour in the Levant’, The New Left Review 45 (May 2007).
114  Interview with an ILO Officer in Beirut; Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Leba-
non, pp. 54-55.
115 ‘Lebanon Farms Reel from Shortage of  Syrian Laborers’, The Daily Star.
116 In Lebanon the services sector accounts for about 70% of  the GDP, agriculture accounts for about 
5% of  the GDP and industry 25% of  the GDP. See World Bank Data. Available at http://data.world-
bank.org/country/lebanon (accessed 13 February 2016).
117 Butter, Syria’s Economy.
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place to reserve these kinds of  jobs for Lebanese citizens. Syrians, however, are keener to 
fill gaps in the job market in labour intensive sectors such as construction (which has been 
booming since the end of  the civil war) and agriculture. Pay for Syrians is usually very 
low and work conditions are poor,118 but the fact that the Lebanese Pound has a stronger 
purchasing power than the Syrian Pound has given an edge of  profit for Syrians workers 
who send their remittances back home.
Table 1: Difference in Levels of Education between Lebanon and Syria
Source: World Bank Data, 2007
Lebanon Syria
Working force with Primary degree 46% 55%
Working force with Secondary Degree 18% 20%
Working Force with Tertiary Degree 24% 8%
In addition to the economic factors, social and family connections are also strong across 
the border. The area in which the refugee crisis began, Wadi Khaled, is populated by 
thousands of  people whose nationality was regularised only in 1994 by a controversial 
decree issued by Rafiq Hariri’s government.119 Originally, the border with Lebanon in 
those areas was not clearly demarcated; in fact, many inhabitants are also Syrians or 
hold a provisional citizenship status there.120 Family ties, and national identity are blurry 
realities in this area and in other border regions cutting across the already porous Leb-
anese-Syrian border. Furthermore, trade and transhumance have also contributed to a 
fluid border situation.121
Although it was the country that would have had the least to offer in terms of  security, 
stability, and isolation from the conflict, Lebanon is also the country with the most estab-
lished migratory record historically in regards to Syrians,122 and this is likely to be a crucial 
factor in explaining why it has become the state with the fastest and most concentrated 
population transfer from Syria. 
118 Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon, pp. 81-84.
119 Guita Hourani, The 1994 Naturalisation Decree. Available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/
LEB-1994NaturalizationDecree-GuitaHouraniNov2011.pdf  (accessed 8 February 2016). 
120 Guita Hourani and Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous, ‘Naturalized Citizens: Political Participation, Voting 
Behavior, and Impact on Elections in Lebanon (1996–2007)’, Journal of  International Migration and Inte-
gration 13/2 (2012).
121 Dawn Chatty, Nisrine Mansour, and Nasser Yassin, ‘Statelessness and Tribal Identity on Lebanon’s 
Eastern Borders’, Mediterranean Politics 18/3 (2013). See also Dawn Chatty, Displacement and Dispossession 
in the Modern Middle East, The Contemporary Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
122 It is worth noting that Syrian workers already present in the country before the beginning of  the 
crisis may have registered as refugees with the UNHCR once the crisis in Syria erupted. This may have 
contributed to the number of  UNHCR registrations, although these refugees were not effectively part 
of  the migration that has taken place since the beginning of  the crisis in Syria.
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Conclusions
Based on conversations with policymakers, officers from international organisations, 
and civil society activists, this report has provided an analysis of  the social and political 
dynamics of  the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. 
Despite the resilience shown by both Lebanese society and the refugee population, the com-
plex nature of  the crisis poses an unprecedented challenge for state and society, and deserves 
attention from Lebanon’s international partners as well as from domestic political author-
ities. The situation can only be managed if  the fragility of  Lebanese social and political 
institutions, as well as the vulnerability of  the refugees themselves, are taken into account.
As the humanitarian crisis shows no signs of  subsiding and the conflict continues unabated, 
long-term strategies that go beyond immediate humanitarian aid must be developed. Cru-
cially, Lebanese institutions must be strengthened, especially in their capacity to provide 
welfare to both refugees and Lebanese nationals. 
Failing to appreciate the urgency of  this issue will inevitably expose Lebanese governance 
to further strains and increase the precariousness of  Syrian presence in Lebanon. This 
will have the effect of  protracting the current crisis and potentially lead to even more 
regional instability. 
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إلى منظمات المجتمع المدني
أن تحافظ على الاستقلالية عن الديناميات السياسية والطائفية.	 
أن تكفل العلاقات بين المجتمعات المضيفة واللاجئين، بالتأكد من أن المساعدات لا تسبب شعورا ًبالحرمان النسبي ولا يكون 	 
لها آثارا ًاستقطابية.
إلى الجمهور
أن يتبرعوا لمنظمات الإغاثة الشفافة ذات السمعة الطيبة التي تعلن عن حساباتها بشكل واضح.	 
أن يبقوا مطلعين من مصادر موثوقة ضد التنميط السطحي وتصورات انعدام الأمن غير المبررة المرتبطة بعمليات الهجرة.	 
أن يدركوا أن الدول وحكومتهم (أيا ًكان توجههم السياسي) لديها التزام قانوني دولي بمساعدة وحماية اللاجئين مبني على 	 
القانون الدولي العرفي ومعزز بالعديد من المعاهدات الدولية التي تصادق عليها بانتظام غالبية الدول.
 73 iginoiD oppiliF
توجيهات مقترحة للعمل
إلى المؤسسات اللبنانية
ينبغي على المؤسسات الرسمية في لبنان أن تضع إطارا ًقانونيا ًواضحا ًيوفر للاجئين وضعا ًواضح المعالم يحمي حقوقهم.	 
ينبغي على المؤسسات اللبنانية السماح للسورين بالحصول على الخدمات الضرورية والتمتع بالحقوق الأساسية كالحق بالعمل.	 
ينبغي على المجموعات السياسية اللبنانية أن تبذل جهدا ًفي التعاطي باستمرار مع الوجود السوري كقضية إنسانية على وجه 	 
الحصر، في محاولة لتجنب تسييس هوية اللاجئ من خلال ربط وجودهم بفصيل سياسي أو طائفي ما أو آخر.
ينبغي  مساندة  المجتمع  الأكاديمي  والمدني  الوفير في  لبنان في وضع  استراتيجيات  البحث  والاتصال  لتجنب  انتشار  الخطاب 	 
المعادي للأجانب ولإظهار الآثار الحقيقية للأزمة من منظور حل المشكلة.
ينبغي على المؤسسات اللبنانية التعاون من أجل تنمية وإنشاء سياق للتعاون الإقليمي لحماية اللاجئين.	 
 إلى الدول والمؤسسات فوق الوطنية (lanoitanarpuS)
ينبغي  على  جميع  الدول  والمؤسسات  فوق  الوطنية  مثل  الاتحاد  الأوروبي  ومجلس  التعاون  الخليجي  زيادة  الدعم  المالي 	 
والمحافظة على استمراريته من أجل عمل إنساني شفاف وفعال ومشاريع تنموية متعلقة باللاجئين والمجتمعات المضيفة معا.ً
ينبغي على جميع الدول والمؤسسات فوق الوطنية الوفاء بتعهداتها لتوفير المساعدات والتمويل التي اعلنت عليها خلال 	 
المؤتمرات  الدولية.
ينبغي على جميع الدول والمؤسسات فوق الوطنية أن تبادر حالا بعمليات إعادة التوطين، و/أو في تنقيح لوائح التأشيرات 	 
والهجرة بحيث تكون متناسبة مع حجم الأزمة.
ينبغي على الدول والكيانات فوق الوطنية تسهيل إنشاء معاهدة إقليمية لحماية اللاجئين في الشرق الأوسط.	 
ينبغي على الدول أن تلتزم المعايير القانونية التي تخضع لها بمقتضى القانون العرفي الدولي والمعاهدات (بما في ذلك اتفاقية عام 	 
1591 الخاصة بوضع اللاجئين والوثائق الملحقة بها) والتي تبلّغ بالتزامات محددة تجاه حماية اللاجئين.
ينبغي أن تفكر الدول جديا بأن “تقاسم الأعباء” بدلاً من “تقديم المال” هو استراتيجية أساسية للتعامل مع الأزمة بنجاح 	 
وبمنظور بعيد المدى.
إلى المنظمات الدولية
أن تكفل استمرار العلاقات البناءة بين المجتمعات المضيفة واللاجئين، بالتأكد من أن المساعدات لا تسبب شعورا ًبالحرمان 	 
النسبي ولا يكون لها آثارا ًاستقطابية.
أن تبرز وتقوي الطاقة التنموية لإدارة الأزمات للمجتمعات المحلية والحكومة الوطنية.	 
أن تفكر جديا ًفي أن المساعدات الخارجية على الرغم من مدى أهميتها في الحفاظ على العمليات الجارية لا يمكنها أن تكون 	 
سوى استراتيجية قصيرة إلى متوسطة المدى وأنه ينبغي تسهيل الاستدامة الاقتصادية طويلة الأجل للوجود السوري.
أن تستفيد من السجل التاريخي للهجرات السورية إلى لبنان، والتي كانت موردا ًاقتصاديا ًمهما ًعلى مدى عقود والتي تعتمد 	 
أيضا ًعلى الروابط الثقافية بالإضافة إلى الروابط العائلية. الشبكات غير الرسمية تشكل أيضا ًأدوات هامة تساعد اللاجئين 
السوريين على تعزيز أوضاعهم خلال النزوح. 
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الملخص التنفيذي
بدأ الصراع السوري في عام 1102 وتسبب بما لا يقل عن 000,052 من الضحايا المدنيين حتى الآن؛1 فقد دمر البنية التحتية 
والأنشطة2 الاقتصادية وحّول مناطق بأكملها من الدولة إلى مناطق شبه فوضوية، أو مناطق يحكمها أمراء الحرب. هذه هي 
فقط العوامل الأكثر بديهية التي أجبرت ملايين السوريين على الفرار من منازلهم للعثور على ملاذ في مناطق أخرى من سوريا 
أو في الخارج. إن أرقام هذه الهجرة القسرية لا سابقة لها. فوفقا لمصادر رسمية هناك 6.6 ملايين مهجرين داخليا ًو 7.4 مليون 
لاجئ؛3 أي ما يقرب من نصف سكان سوريا.
لقد تسجل نحو 2.1 مليون سوري مع المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين في لبنان. على الأرجح، الرقم الفعلي 
لعدد السوريين في لبنان في وقت كتابة هذا التقرير هو أعلى بكثير.
إن  لبنان، من حيث  القرب  الجغرافي واللغة وعلى أساس علاقات  تاريخية طويلة  الأمد هو من بين  الوجهات  الأكثر  بديهية 
للسوريين  الذين  يحاولون  الهروب من  الحرب  الأهلية. ومع  ذلك،  فإن هذا  البلد  الصغير  (أكبر  قليلا ً من قبرص)  الذي  يبلغ 
عدد سكانه حوالي 4 ملايين نسمة ولديه تاريخ مضطرب من العلاقات مع دمشق ليس بالمكان المثالي لتوفير الحماية للاجئين 
السوريين.4 فالعديد من الفصائل السياسية في لبنان والجماعات شبه العسكرية ترتبط ارتباطا ًوثيقا ًأو تشارك مباشرة في الأحداث 
في سوريا، و مؤسسات الدولة اللبنانية معروفة بإمكانيتها الضئيلة على توفير الخدمات والأمن الأساسيين للبنانيين أنفسهم. 
الصراع السوري في عامه الخامس، وعلى الرغم من أنه من المنطقي أن تكون تداعياته قد امتدت إلى لبنان، فقد ظلت الحوادث 
الأمنية الخطيرة  التي جرت محلية وعرضية حتى الآن. لقد  أثارت أزمة اللاجئين المخاوف، ونظر  إليها على  أنها عامل عدم 
استقرار إضافي في السياق الاجتماعي والسياسي والاقتصادي للبلد. لكن بالنظر إلى حجم الظاهرة، فإن أثرها لم يتسبب حتى 
الآن بالاختلال الذي كان من المعقول توقعه. السوريون في لبنان ضعفاء ومن هم في فئة “النازحين” يعزلون على نحو متزايد، 
في حين تنهك المجتمعات المحلية المضيفة بسبب الطاقة المحدودة للبنية التحتية وزيادة التنافس على الخدمات والموارد. ومع 
ذلك فإن حالات الاحتكاك مع اللاجئين لا تزال محدودة نسبيا ًحتى الآن.
يقدم هذا التقرير عرضا ًللوضع من خمسة أقسام. أولاً، يقدم سردا ًللأزمة التي تتوضح تدريجيا ًمن وجهة نظر المؤسسات 
السياسية في لبنان. بعد ذلك يرسم خريطة تفاعلات الأزمة السياسية، مع التركيز على الجهات الفاعلة الرئيسية المعنية. فيما 
بعد، يقدم تحليلاً لوضع النازحين السوريين في لبنان، الذي يشكل أحد المصادر الرئيسية لضعفهم. ثم يخصص قسما ًلتسليط 
الضوء على الدور الذي تقوم به الإدارات المحلية والمنظمات الدولية في إدارة الأزمة. يوضح القسم الأخير كيف أن للهجرات 
السورية اللبنانية تاريخا ًموحدا ًعلى أساس المصالح الاقتصادية والاجتماعية المتبادلة والروابط الثقافية.
وبناء على هذه الاعتبارات، يختتم التقرير بمجموعة من مسارات العمل الممكنة التي ينبغي أن تضطلع بها مختلف الجهات 
المعنية. الهدف من هذا التقرير هو تعزيز معرفة أزمة اللاجئين السوريين في لبنان وفهمها ، وعلى هذا الأساس، اقتراح مبادئ 
توجيهية للسياسة التي يمكن أن تسهل حماية اللاجئين وكذلك دعم الاستقرار والتنمية في البلد المضيف.
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